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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RODNEY L. PHILLIPS, 
Plaintiff-R~spondent, 
vs. 
JCM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Utah: 
corporation; JAMCES C. McGARRY, JR.; 
LINDA McGARRY; JAMES R. GLAVAS, dba: 
J. G. REALTY; JAMES GLEASON; ROBERT 
G. ANDERSON; UNITED FARM AGENCY., 
INC., a Utah corporation; CLAN 
STILSON; and DOES I through XV, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18211. 
This is an action by the plaintiff against the defendant,_ 
United Farm Agency, Inc., a Utah corporation, for damages arising 
out of a real estate transaction. 
DISPOSITION IN.THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Boyd BuJ;l.nell on the 
29th and 30th day of July, 1981. The Court granted judgment·in 
favor of the plaintiff on July 30, 1981, against all of the defen-
dants and took under advisement the amount of the damages 
suffered by the plaintiff. On September 4, 1981, the Court f.iled 
its Memorandum Decision (R. 213-215), and on October 14, 1981, 
the Court signed and filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment (R. 232-243). 
The defendant, United Farm Agency, filed its Motion for a 
new Trial which was denied by the Court by its Order filed Decem-
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ber 24, 1981 (R. 285). The notice of appeal was filed on 
·January 8, 1982 (R. 304). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant requests that this Court reverse the lower 
court's decision or in the alternative, remand the case for 
further hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff Rodney Phillips operated, as a sole proprietor-
ship, a construction company kno\~1 as Phillips Construction Com-
pany from 1970 to the first part of 1978. During the first of 
1978 and before the transactions that precipitated this action 
(Tr. 242-43), ~he plaintiff formed a corporation known as Phillips 
Construction Company (Tr. 131-32). After the formation of the 
corporation, all of the business and business assets were owned by 
the corporation, with the exception of the equipment of which Hr. 
Phillips retained personal ownership (Tr. 132). 
During 1978, the plaintiff went through a divorce (Tr. 135) 
and was facing substantial financial difficulty in that his checks 
were bouncing (Tr. 287-88). Accordingly on January 25, 1978, the 
plaintiff listed his home and construction business for sale with 
the defendant Robert Anderson, a real estate agent (Ex. 6, Tr. 14). 
At a later time, . a separate listing was made for the construction 
business alone which listed the selling price of $200,000 (Tr. 
14-15). None of the listings were signed by Clan Stilson or a 
person in authority for United Farm. Mr. Phillips corJmunicated 
to the real estate agent that the business had grossed over a 
million dollars during the last year and that the business had a 
-2-
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·~ .. mit.ing list for ne·w construction (Ex. 8), althouc;h the records 
of the business did not reflect any of those representations 
(Ex. 43, 44, 45 and 46). On June 13, 1978, two additional list-
ings were signed by the plaintiff on the shop and business lowering 
the price to $185,000 in an attempt to expedite the sale of the 
business (Tr. 27-28, Ex. 14, 15). 
Mr. Gerald (Bud) Stocks introduced the defendants, James 
Gleason and James McGarry to Mr. Anderson as persons who were 
interested in buying Phillips Construction Company (Tr.. 37, 
343-45). On July 17, 1978, James G. McGarry, James Gleason, Bud 
Stocks arid Robert Anderson met Rodney Phillips on the site of 
one of Phillips's jobs to discuss the possible sale of the busi-
ness (Tr. 38, 136). At that time, Gerald (Bud) Stocks was intro-
duced as a referring real estate agent from First Realty Group,· 
Mr. McGarry as president of JCM Development Company and James 
Gleason as an associate of McGarry's and agent of.J. G. Realty 
(Tr. 136-37, 341-42, 38-39). The afternoon of July 17, 1978, 
was spent looking at some of the corporation's jobs amd equip-
ment, meeting employees and reviewing some of the documents relat-
ing to the business operation of the const_t;uction company (Tr. 
40-41, 137-38, 142, 344-45). 
On July 18, 1978, the parties met mid-morning and went to 
the construction company's office. The parties reviewed documents, 
looked at equipment and engaged in discussion relative to a 
possible sale (Tr. 41-43, 143-44). During the late afternoon or 
evening of July 18, 1978, Bob Anderson, James M~Garry, James Glea-
son and Rodney Phillips met at Mr. Anderson's <?ffice (Tr. 43, 143). 
-~-
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There is a dispute in the evidence as to the extent of Larry Ander-
son's involvement in the meeting, but Rodney Phillips, acting for 
the corporation, James McGarry for JCM Development Company and 
James Gleason for J. G. Realty came to terms and signed an earnest 
money agreement: A check for $5,000.00 was presented to the plain-
tiff, but no closing date was set (Ex. 18, Tr. 43, 50-51, 144-45). 
After the plaintiff Phillips had met with McGarry and Gleason, 
the defendant Robert Anderson, learned that the parties were going 
to complete the sale by means of a simple stock transfer and a bill 
of sale (Tr. 43). Mr. Anderson advi.sed the plaintiff that the 
transaction should not be handled that way and commented that 
the Bulk Sales Act would not be complied with and that other 
essential elements of a typical sale were being omitted (Tr. 43-45, 
49). The defendant Anderson testified that after he had protested 
the manner in which the transaction was being handled, Mr. 
Gleason stated that Mr. Anderson should let Gleason handle the 
transaction and accordingly the earnest money was written on Mr. 
Gleason's forms (Tr. 45, 47, 48). Mr. Anderson did not see the 
signed earnest money until almost a month later (Tr. 52), and 
assumed that the plaintiff knew that he was not representing him 
because Phillips signed an agreement against Anderson's advise 
on another real estate company's forms (Tr. 53). The Court found 
that Anderson never expressly advised the plaintiff that he was 
no longer representing Phillips (R. 234, Findings No. 13). 
Contemporaneous to the time of the transaction that he was 
negotiating for the plaintiff with McGarry, Gleason and JCM 
Development Company, the defendant, Robert Anderson, had been 
-4-
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requested to sell 20 acres of his land in Spanish Valley to 
McGarry, Gleason and JCM Development Company and to help in 
the d.eve lo pm en t o £ other property (Tr. 3 7, 3 8) • At the time 
of the negotiation, Robert Anderson was behind on his 
$1,000.00 payments to First Security Bank on the Spanish 
Valley.property (Tr. 32-33). On July 18, 1978, Anderson 
signed an earnest money with J. G. Realty and JCM Development 
Company for the purchase of his 20 acres (Ex. 19, Tr. 55, 56). 
Anderson testified that the plaintiff knew of th~ transaction 
because he told him and because Phillips was asked to do work · 
on the subdivision property by Skipper Resources (R. 59). In·· 
fact, the plaintiff admitted at trial that he knew about the 
development (Tr. 155, 156). 
In addition, Anderson was negotiating to obtain exclusive 
listings on the lots that would be developed on the land he had 
sold to JCM Development and the surrounding acreage that was to be 
developed into a mobile home subdivision (Tr. 60-62), _by JCl111. Develop-
ment, McGarry and Gleason. McGarry and Gleason intended to use 
Phillips Construction Company to construct the development (Tr. 65-66). 
The plaintiff contended that the defendant Anderson .repre-
sented to him.on several occasions that JGM Development Company 
was worth millions of dollars (Tr. 153, 154), but.Anderson testi-
fied that he reported only what Gleason and McGarry had told him 
(Tr. 67-68). Obviously Anderson would not have dealt with the other 
defendants personally, if he knew of any financial problems or finan-
cial risk. 
The parties continued their.preparation for closing and on 
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Aut;ust 14, 1973, the plaintiff met with James McGarry, James 
Gleason and Robert Anderson (Tr. 161). Calculations and computa-
tions were made by the parties, and adjustments to the inventory 
were made. The accounts receivable and payable were adjusted 
by the plaintiff and the defendants McGarry and Gleason (Tr. 161-
62). The earnest money had provided for a Forty Thousand Dollar 
($40,000.00) down payment which> at the meeting of August 14th, 
was converted to a Thirty-five Thousand Dollar ($35,000.00) pro-
missory note, signed by JCM Development Corporation which toge-
ther with the Five Thousand Dollar ($5,000.00) down payment 
totaled Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00) (Tr. 162-63, 
Ex. 24). The remainder of the plaintiff's equity was evidenced 
by another promissory note in the amount of Forty-four Thousand 
Dollars ($44,000.00), payable over a period of years, signed 
again by JCM Development Corporation (Tr. 163, Ex. 25). 
In addition to the two promissory notes, the plaintiff, on 
behalf of the corporation, signed warranty deeds, stock transfer 
papers and other related documents transferring all of his in-
terest in the corporation to the defendant, JCM Development 
(Tr. 163-165). The plaintiff testified that the signing of the 
documents took over two hours (Tr. 163). Robert Anderson testi-
fied that he typed some of the docu.illents and compiled information 
as ·requested by the various parties (Tr. 82-83). Robert Anderson 
testified that he didn't think he was conducting a closing in 
t~at United Farm's ptilicy required that a closing through their 
agertcy be done by the broker or through an attorney, neither 
of which occurred in this case (Tr. 29). 
-6-
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The plaintiff testified that he relied on certain representa-
tions of the defendant, Anderson, as to the financial solvency of 
the defendants in accepting the promissory notes without security 
(Tr. 164;...165). The defendant, Robert Anderson, denied making any 
such representations and stated that he had communicated only what 
had been communicated to him by McGarry and Gleason (Tr~ 74, 88-89). 
After the execution of the documents on.August 14, 1978, 
the promissory notes signed by these defendants were not paid. 
There was no evidence at trial to directly connect the 
defendant, United Farm Agency or the broker Clan Stilson to this 
transaction. The only liability of United Farm Agency and Clan 
Stilson is derivative. No one acting in the furtherance of 
United Farm's interest participated in the transaction. Addi-
tionally United Farm never received any monetary benefit or any 
portion of a commission from the sale. 
POINT l 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED 
AT TRIAL TO BASE A VERDICT AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT, UNITED FARM AGENCY, INC., A 
UTAH CORPORATION. 
In the Court's Findings of Fact. and Conclusions of Law, the 
Court found that the defendant, Robert Anderson, breached his 
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff (1) by by unilaterally deciding 
not to further represent the plaintiff in the sale of his pro-
perty and by not advising the plaintiff of said decision (Find-
ings No. 25, R. 236); (2) by failing to discharge his duty to 
verify the solvency of JCM Development and by representing the 
worth of JCM to the· plaintiff (Findings No. 26, R. 237); (3) by 
failing to discharge his duty, imposed by United Farm Agency 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
policy, to see that an a~torney conduct the plaintiff's closing 
(Findings No. 27, R. 237); (4) by preparing unsecured notes 
and allowing the plaintiff to accept said notes and to part with 
his assets (Findings No. 28, R. 237); and, (5) by failing to 
investigate J. G. Realty and assuring the plaintiff of J. G. Realty's 
legitimacy (Findings No. 29, R. 237). 
The evidence in this case, simply does not support the impu-
tation of Robert Anderson's liability to the broker, Clan Stilson, 
or to United Farm Agency, a Utah corporation. The only proof 
elicited regarding the issue of agency or employment was done 
during the examination of Robert Anderson. Mr. Anderson 
testified that he was a sales representative for United Farm 
Agency of Utah and that his duties included responsibilities for 
the listing and selling of property (Tr. 4). Further, Robert 
Anderson testified that he was a real estate agent, having been 
licensed in the state of Utah since 1975 and that Hr. Clan Stilson 
was the broker for United Farm Agency in the State of Utah (Tr. 
5-6). 
When specifically asked what role Clan Stilson played in 
the transaction which precipitated this lawsuit, l•Ir • ...L\nderson testi-
fied that Mr. Stilson had no involvement and further testified 
that United Farm Agency policy required its salespersons to 
obtain approval of the broker for preliminary matters and that 
United Farm Agency required the involvement of a broker or 
attorney to handle the closing. He further testified that on 
prior occasions, Mr. Snow, the attorney in Hoab, acted as the 
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transactions in which Hr. Phi:.llips had been. involved, Hr. Snow 
was the person who prepared the documents and supervised the 
closing transaction (R. 122-123). 
In this case, the listing of the business was evidenced by 
Business and Income Exclusive Listing Agreements of United Farm 
Agency (Ex. 6, 14, 15). After the signing of the listing agree-
ments, United Farm Agency, a Utah corporation nor its broker, 
Clan Stilson, had any involvement with any of the remainder of the 
transaction. Particularly, the earnest money agre:ement signed 
in this action was not a United Farm Agency document (Ex. 18), 
and the parties understood that to be the case (Tr. 45, 145-147). 
No attorney or broker for United Farm Agency participated in or 
became involved in the Phillips-JCM Development transaction or 
closing. There were no sellers' or buyers' statements furnished 
by United Farm Agency as required by their policies and proce-
dures. Simply put, if the Court adopts the entered findings 
of the trial court, the transaction and the exchange of documents 
that occurred on August 14, 1978, were in complete violation of 
the United Farm Agency policies and practices as established by 
the plaintiff in his case. 
The relationship of broker and real estate salesman is defined 
in the State of Utah by legislative enactment. Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended, §61-2-1 et seq., ·sets forth the relationship 
of agent and broker as it pertains to the sale of real estate in 
the State of Utah. The term "real estate salesman," is defined 
to include: 
• . • any person employed or engaged 
by or ·on behalf of a licensed real 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
broker to do or to deal in any act or 
transaction set out or comprehended 
by the definition of a real estate 
broker in §61-2-2 for compensation or 
otherwise. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Annotated §61-2-3, 1953, as amended. 
Utah Code Annotated §61-2-20, 1953, as amended, sets forth 
the specific rights _and duties of a real estate salesman as 
follows: 
It is expressly provided that a real 
estate salesman shall have the right to 
fill out and complete an earnest money 
receipt and agreement in form to be · 
approved by the commission and forms 
provided by statute and that a real estate 
broker shall have the right to fill 
out and complete forms of legal docu-
ments necessary to any real estate trans-
action to which the said broker is a 
party as principle or agent, and which 
forms have been approved by the commis-
sion and Attorney General of the State 
of Utah. Such forms shall include a 
closing real estate contract, a short-
form lease, and a bill of sale of personal 
property. 
In fact, on all of the United Farm Agency earnest ·money agree-
ments and even as indicated on Exhibit 18, introduced at trial, 
there is a space provided on Line 44 for the broker of the real 
estate company to sign, evidencing his review of the document. 
In this case, neither the broker for United Farm Agency, Clan 
Stilson, nor any other agent or employee of Unit.ed Farm Agency, 
a Utah corporation, endorsed Exhibit 18 or any of the other 
documents exchanged between the parties. The closing was not 
supervised by the broker for unit:ed Farm Agency or by an attorney. 
The closing documents and the docurnent-s evidencing the transaction · 
in this case do not meet the statutory requirements of Utah Code 
-10-
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Annot:ated §61-2-20 in that there was not a closing real estate 
contract used in conjunction with a bill of sale for personal 
property or other closing statements. Needless to say, no real 
estate documents evidencing the sale were executed on United 
Farm Agency forms· or signed by the broker in charge. 
In essence, the only involvement of United Farm Agency, a 
Utah corporation, is that of· the listing agreement. All of the 
transactions after that point in time were handled by Robert 
Anderson without complying either with the statutory require-
ments set out above or with United Farm Agency policy and proce-
dure. 
In analyzing the question of when United Farm Agency would 
be liable for the acts of Robert Anderson, several Utah Supreme 
Court cases are instructive. The Utah Supreme Court dealt with 
a similar matter in Wilkerson.v. Stevens, 16 Utah 2d 424, 
403 P.2d 31 (1965). In that case, the vendor brought an action 
against a real estate salesman to recover a sum of money received 
by the salesman as an intermediary in connection with the sale of 
a house, and against the realty company as an undis.closed prin-
ciple. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the 
realty company and the vendor appealed. In affirming the deci-
sion, the Supreme Court, through Justice Crockett, stated the 
criteria to be applied in analyzing the responsibility o~ the 
realty company. The Court· noted that since the plaintiff had 
dealt with the real est.ate agent on a personal basis and sought 
to go beyond that agent to hold a third party liable, it was the 
plaintiff's burden to prove that such a principal and agency 
-11-
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relationship existed. Wilkerson, supra at 32. Sec also, 
Cote v. A. J. Bayless Markets, Inc., 128 Az. 438, 626 P.2d 602 
(1981); B & D Investment Corp. v. Petticord, 48 Or.App. 345, 
617 P.2d 276 (1980) (Further, the cases speaking to that issue 
have held that there is no presumption of agency and that evi-
dence must be put on by the person who alleges it. Sturm v. Green, 
398 P.2d 799 (Okla. 1965); Seattle~First National Bank v. Pacific 
Bank of Wa~hington, 22 Wash.App. 46, 587 P.2d 617 (1978)). 
Justice Crockett in Wilkerson supra, specifically pointed 
to the fact that there had been prior dealings between the plaintiff 
and the defendant, Stevens, and that in one such transaction, the 
real estate agent had agre-ed to terms other than cash for the 
payment of his commission. Justice Crockett pointed to the fact 
that the real estate ,agent -had.acted in his own name and that 
there was no listing agreement with the realty company and that 
its name did not appear on any document nor was it mentioned in 
any way. Further, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had not 
relied upon the agent in connection with the realty company. 
Justice Crockett stated that inasmuch as the realty company did 
not receive or claim a commission on the transaction and that it 
did not participate in any manner or know anything about the 
transaction until the lawsuit was filed, the realty company ought 
not to be held responsible for the acts of the agent. Wilkerson, 
supra at 32-33. 
The meaningful differences between the facts in Wilkerson, 
suera, and the facts of this case are that in this case, there 
is a listing agreement on a United Farm Agency form, although 
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the broker's signature does not appear thereon and because 
there is no undisclosed principle in this case. As in the 
Wilkerson case, Robert Anderson and the plaintiff had exten-
sive prior dealings. In fact, the plaintiff, in tracing that 
history of prior dealings between Phillips and Anderson con-
sumed from page 7 of the transcript through page 30. Throughout 
the transcript, there is reference to prior dealings ·between 
Robert Anderson individually with the plaintiff. In accord 
with the Wilkerson case, there had been a prior instance be-
tween Anderson and Phillips in which Anderson did not get a 
cash commission hut simply received office space in a building 
and in addition, was charged no rent for three months (Tr. 
7, 132-33). Further, in accord with the Wilkerson case, the 
plaintiff, Phillips, testified that his reliance on Robert 
Anderson came because of his prior experience with him. 
The plaintiff testified explicitly as follows: 
Bob was-had-he handled all my dealings· 
and I had complete trust with him. He 
had done a fantastic job closing my home 
and my motel, and we were doing exactly 
the same thing. We were putting together 
the closing papers on this transaction 
the exact same way we had done with my 
motel. We went over all these papers 
and filled them all and then we took them 
down to Harry Snow, and he finalized it, 
and I thought that's what we were going 
to do on.this sale and I expected that 
the same process to take place. 
(Tr. 165). Despite the fact of the prior dealings, Harry Snow 
was never contacted, a closing statement was never made, (Tr. 
170), and neither Harry Snow nor the broker for United Farm 
Agency was ever contacted rega.rding the case. 
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The Utah Supreme Court in Wells v. Walker 3ank & Trust Co., 
Inc., 590 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1979), stated this rule again in a 
case which involved an action by an assignee for the benefit of 
the creditors of a trust against banks, alleging that the banks 
had negligently honored "altered" checks drawn on the trust 
account. In that case, the Court stated the general principles 
relative to this issue: 
Walker Bank urges that the doctrine of 
respondeat superior is applicable. As 
is true in other areas of the law, the 
general rule regarding the liability of 
a master for such acts of his servant, 
is that an alteration of a negotiable 
instrument (or other document) by an 
agent is, in effect, the act of ·his 
principal if such alteration is made 
within the scope of the express or im-
plied authority of the agent. It is of 
course to be recognized that if the em-
ployee is not so authorized and is. act.ing 
for his own interest, and not in furtherance 
of the employer's business, the latter 
would not be bound by his act. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Wells, supra, at 1263-64. A further statement of this legal 
principle is found in 3 Am.Jur.2d, Agency, §267 
Fundamentally, and according to both the 
restatement and the American Courts, there 
is no distinction to be drawn between 
the liability of a principal for the 
tortious act of his agent and liability 
of a master for the tortious act of his 
servant. In both cases, the tort lia-
bility is based on the master and servant, 
rather than any agency, principle; the 
liability for the tortious act of the 
employee is grounded upon the maxim of 
."respondeat superior" and is to be deter-
mined by considering, from a factual stand-
point, the question whether the tortious 
act was done while the employee, whether 
agent or servant, was acting within the 
scope of his employment. 
-14-
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3 A:m.Jur.2d Agency, supra at 632. 
Accordingly, t~e issues presented in this point are two in 
number: First, whether the relationship of employer-employee 
existed between Anderson and United Farm Agency, and second, 
whether the actions of Anderson were authorized or whether they 
were acts for his own interests and not in furtherance of his 
employer's business. 
Various courts have looked at a variety of factors to deter-
mine whether a person is an employee or.an independent contractor. 
A list of some of the factors to be considered are found in 
Stewart v. Midani, 525 F~Supp. 823, 849 (N.D.Ga. 1981). The 
Court listed eight factors as being indicative of an employee- · 
employer relationship: (1) the right of the employer to direct 
the work step by step; (2) contracts to perform a service rather 
than to accomplish a task; (3) the employer's authority to con_-
trol the employee's time; (4) the employer's right to inspect the 
employee's work; (5) who supplies the equipment; (6) the right 
·to ter~inate the ~ontract; (7) the nature or skill 6£ the 
employee's wor:k; and, (8) the method of payment. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the context of the statutory 
·definition of "independent contractor'' in workman's compen-
sation matters, has stated the following: 
Speaking in generality: an employee is 
one who is hired and paid a·salary, a 
wage, or at a fixed rate, to perform the 
employer's work .as directed by the employer . 
and who is subject to a comparatively 
high degree of control in performing 
those duties. In contrast, an independent 
contractor is one who is engaged to do 
. some particular project or piece of work, 
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usually for a set total sum, who may do 
the job in his o~m ·way, subject only to 
minimal restrictions or controls and is 
responsible only for its satisfactory 
completion. 
The main facts to be considered as bear-
ing on the relationship here are: (1) 
whatever covenants or agreements exist 
concerning the right of direction and con-
trol over the employee, whether express 
or implied; (2) the right to hire and 
fire; (3) the method of payment, i.e., 
whether in wages or fees, as· compared 
to payment for a complete job or project; 
and, (4) the furnishing of the equip-
ment. 
Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316; 318 (Utah 
1975). 
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff did not put 
on sufficient proof to establish the employment relationship and 
that the evidence.which was introduced proves that an employer-
-
employee relationship did not exist and that any acts of Anderson 
were for his ovm interests not within the authority given him 
by United Farm Agency. 
The evidence introduced at trial indicates that Mr. Anderson 
was not an employee of United Farm Agency. There was no showing 
that United Farm Agency had the right or ability to control or 
direct the work step by step. In fact, aside from setting out 
its .policies and procedures as to how a proper transaction should 
be handled for United Farm Agency, there was no supervision at 
all of 1'1r. Anderson's activities and conduct. In fact, the work 
that was done, in closing this transaction:,,on August 14th, did 
not involve any of United Farm Agency forms nor did it comply 
with its established procedures. In this case, Robert Anderson 
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agreed to perform a service for a set fee as opposed to so1ae 
hourly compensation. There was no evidence that withholdin6 
taxes were taken from Mr·. Anderson's commission and established 
practice indicates that such would not be the case. There was 
no evidence as to any employee health or pension benefits. 
Further, there was no evidence at all that United Farro Agency 
had furnished Mr. Anderson with any accouterments for his 
office or for use in real estate transactions. In addition, no 
monetary benefit was ever received by United Farm for Anderson's 
efforts in this transaction. The evidence is simply insuffi-
cient to establish an employer-employee relationship between 
United Farm Agency and Robert Anderson. 
Even aside from the employer-employee issue, the way 
that the transaction was handled, as found by the Court in the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, clearly established 
that the manner in which the transaction went forth was in 
direct contravention with the policies and_procedures of United 
Farm Agency and in contravention of the requirements of the Utah 
State statute. Accordingly, as noted in the two Supreme Court 
cases discussing the issue, the activities of 1-'Ir. Anderson as 
found by the trial court were outside of his a_uthority and done 
for his ovm interest. The Court explicitly found .that at the 
time that Mr. Anderson was negotiating the real estate transaction 
for Mr. Phillips, he himself had dealt with JCM Development Com-
pany, Mr. McGarry and Mr. Gleason in selling his 20 acres in 
Spanish Valley and further had been working with the development 
and sale of other real property in the area. . As found by the 
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Court in the Walker Bank case, Hr. Anderson was actin6 for his 
own benefit. 
Based upon the evidentiary record established at trial, it 
is respectfully submitted that the decision imputing the conduct 
of Mr. Anderson to Clan Stilson and United Farm Agency, a Utah 
corporation, is without support in the record and should be re-
versed. In as much as the relationship between real estate 
salesman and broker is established by statute, there should be 
no vicarious liability based on that relationship alone in 
light of the clear violations of policy and statute pertaining 
to the real estate salesman's involvement in the transaction. 
It would create an impossible burden for a real estate company 
to be burdened with liability for a transaction it never reviewed 
or ~participated in. The statute requires broker approval and 
absent that involvement, it is simply unjust to impose liabiliey. 
Alternatively, justice requires that at least more evidence be 
taken on the issue and the plaintiff be required to establish 
facts warranting the imposition of the respondeat-superior doc-
trine. 
POINT II 
AN INDIVIDUAL CANNOT :V.tAINTAIN AN ACTION 
IN HIS OR HER NAME FOR WRONGS DONE BY 
THIRD PARTIES TO A CORPORATION WITH WHICH 
THE INDIVIDUAL IS ASSOCIATED .. 
In the present case, the plaintiff has sued in his name, as 
an individual, for wrongs done to the corporation known as 
Phillips Construction Company. 
The plaintiff alleged in his complaint two distinct types 
of damages. The first type was money due to him. personally 
-18-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for his equity in the corporation. This obligation was evidenced 
by two protnissory notes in the amounts of Thirty-five Thousand 
Dollars ($35,000.00) and Forty-four Thousand Dollars ($44,000.00) · 
respectively. The second type of damage alleged was the failure 
of the defendants JCM, McGarry and Gleason to assume corporate 
debts of approximately Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00) 
(Tr. 317), for which the plaintiff claimed to be ·ultimately 
liable, which was never plead in the complaint and are thereby 
waived under Rule 9(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See Point III of Appellant's brief. 
The plaintiff did not claim or submit proof that the assump-
tion of said corporate debts was evidenced by· a writing of any 
kind at the time of closi.ng. 
Appellant's position is that the plaintiff can only sue 
for damages resulting from default in payment of the promissory: 
notes. The corporation is the only party entitled to sue with 
regard to the failure of the deEendants to assume its liabilities. 
Although the plaintiff may have some ultimate liability on those 
corporate debts, he produced no evidence of any kind that he 
had been pursued individually for said obligations on the majority 
of the debts or that the corporation had insufficient assets to 
satisfy said obligations or that he is entitled to pierce the 
corporate veil of Phillips Construction to pursue the defendants 
individuall. The evidence was that the corporation had assets of 
Sixty-two Thousand Dollars to Sixty-three Thousand Dollars 
($62,000.00 to $63,000.00) in accounts receivable (Tr. 306). 
The defendant testified that Exhibit 45 was the inventory 
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prepared for this. sale which described all of the other 
assets of .Phillips Construction Company. As indicated on the 
document itself, ~· Phillips indicated that the assets of the 
business' exclusive of accounts receivable, totaled Ninety-two 
Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-seven Dollars ($92~427.00). 
Accordingly, the total assets of the business at the time that 
it was sold to the defendants McGarry, Gleason and JCM Develop-
ment Company entailed the Ninety-two Thousand Four Hundred 
Twenty-seven Dollars ($92,427.00) in the property and equipment 
and Sixty-two to Sixty-three Thousand Dollars ($62,000.00 to 
$63,000.00) in accounts receivable for a total of One Hundred 
Fifty-two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-seven Dollars ($152,427.00). 
As indicated in the statement of facts, the plaintiff incorporated 
his business in the early part of 1978 and testified that all of 
the business, was owned by the corporation and belonged to the-
corporation with the except.ion of the equipment over which he 
would retain personal control (Tr. 132). Thus the ·accounts 
payable as well as the receivables were the property of the cor-
poration. 
The plaintiff claims in this action that he is entitled to 
judgment on the two promissory notes executed by JCM Development 
Company and in addition thereto, the plaintiff contends that he 
is entitled to judgment for all of the accounts payable of the 
corporation as he understood them to be at the time of trial. 
It is the defendant, United Farm's position, that the plaintiff 
has no right to recover under the present state of the pleadings. 
Plaintiff's·equity was paid to him in the form of two pro-
-20-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
missory notes, as explained above. Another part of the trans-
action, according to the plaintiff's testimony, was the oral 
agreement that the defendants, JCM Development Company, Gleason 
and McGarry would assume the debts and obligations of the corpora-
tion. Although Phillips may have some ultimate liability on 
those debts, there was no proof as to the bulk of the debts and 
obligations that Phillips had been pursued individually and that 
the corporation, with all of its assets, was not able to satisfy 
the obligations of the creditor. 
The case of Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 
P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979) is illustrative of this point. In Norman, 
supra, the defendant moved to dismiss th_e plaintiff corporation 
as a party·and substitute the individual who was the owner of 
nearly all the stock in the corporation. The trial court granted 
that motion and the plaintiff corporation took an interlocutor~ 
appeal. On appeal, the triat court's decision was reversed and 
the corporation was reinstated as the ·plaintiff. In its holding, 
the Court stated: 
The facts of this case should be reiter-
ated. Plaintiff is seeking damages it 
allegedly has sustained by reason of the 
improper disposition of collateral, the 
title to which plaintiff held and which 
defendant sold pursuant to an agreement 
executed by plaintiff. Under such circum-
stances, plaintiff is the real party in 
interest under Rule 17(a), for even 
though a sharehold_er owns ~11, or prac-
tically all, of the. stock in a corpora-
tion s~ch a fact does not authoriie him 
to sue as an individual for a wrong done 
d h t • II by thir party to t e corpora ion. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Norman at p. 1031, 1032 citing Erlich v. Glasner, CA 9th, 1969, 
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418 F.2d 226; Gentry v. Howard, W.U .. Las., 1973, 365 F.Supp. 567. 
See also 13 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, §5927, p. 346. 
Plaintiff's lack of authority to bring the case in his own 
right is a complete incapacity to sue. He possessed no cause of 
action as an individual and, therefore, failed to state a cause 
of action. 
In its answer, the defendants plead the.plaintiffs failure 
to state a cause of action, however, even a failure to so plead 
would not waive this defect in the plaintiff's complaint. In 
61A Arn.Jur. Pleading §390, p. 374, this principle is stated as 
follows: 
The doctrine of waiver as applied to 
pleadings has well established limita-
tions. It cannot be invoked in respect 
to all faults in the pleading irrespective 
of their gravity, for there are some 
defects and omrnissions so vital and 
radical that want of objection cannot 
cure them, since they" go to the very sub-
stance of the matter in litigation. Of 
such character is an objection •••• 
that it wholly fails to state a cause of 
action which will support a judgment. 
Failure to state a cause of action is 
never waived unless aided or cured by 
the answer or subsequent proceedings. 
The subsequent proceeding in this case did not cure the 
defect that plaintiff never possessed a cause of action. 
The plaintiff attempted.to state that he had personal lia-
bility for the debts of the corporation (Tr. 222), however, a 
shareholder of a corporation is not responsible for obliga-
tions o.£ the corporation regardless of how they were incurred. 
Parker v. Telegift International, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 87, 505 P.2d 
301 (1973). 
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The appellants concede that the plaintiff, as an indivi-
dual, hypothetically could state a cause of action against the 
defendants if there was a valid agreement by them to assume 
corporate obligations for which the plaintiff was held responsi-
ble. However, no such agreement exists. See Point III of this 
brief. 
In the absence of such agreement, the plaintiff can look 
only to the corporation to satisfy its obligations out of its 
assets. 
In this case, the plaintiff transferred all his stock arid 
ownership in the corporation to the defendants. It is axiomatic 
that if the corporation failed to pay and discharge those debts 
and obligations, then the plaintiff must file a lawsuit against 
the corporation alleging the right to indemnification by the 
corporation. If the plaintiff wishes to assert any personal 
liability against the defendants for those debts and obliga-
tions, then he must allege some theory that will allow him to 
pierce the corporate veil and attach the_ responsibility to in-
dividual officers and shareholders. In this case, not only 
did the plaintiff file the lawsuit in his personal name.for 
.debts and obligations that the corporation is responsible for, 
he also failed to name the corporation as a defendant or allege 
any theory against individuals which would allow the court to 
pierce the corporate veil. 
It is established law that the plaintiff must do more than 
simply state that in his opinion, he is legally liable for the cor-
porate debts and obligations. Certainly, there must be some evidence 
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that as to all of the debts and obli6ations, the creditor has 
been unable to satisfy his obligation against the corporation and 
is, at the present time, seeking to collect those amounts from the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff put on such evidence with regard to 
two of the obligations, but totally failed to meet that task with 
regard to the bulk of the over One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000.00) of debts and obligations that ~e testified to at 
trial. A simple analogy might be helpful. If Phillips had co-
signed with any of the defendants on a loan for the purchase 
of an automobile, he could file suit for indemnification from 
the defendants only if he could prove that the amount was not 
paid, that the creditor had sought relief against him and that 
he had either paid or became obligated to pay. In this case, 
there was no evidence that the assets "'of the corporation had been 
liquidated, or that the creditors had somehow been unsuccessfui 
in applying the corporate assets against the corporate liabilities. 
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that -the failure 
to pay the corprate debts and obligations may be a cause of action 
of the corporation against its officers and directors but cer-
tainly is not a cause of action for Rodney Phillips, individually. 
Absent the essential proof that he has become legally liable for 
the debts .and obligations he testified to at trial from the 
bankruptcy schedule, there is no evidence on that issue to support 
the judgment. 
Of equal importance in this matter is the bankruptcy issue. 
Plaintiff testified at trial that although he was having diffi-
culties in me~ting his obligations, he was not forced to file 
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bankruptcy until after this transaction occurred. The plaintiff, 
as a bankrupt, in bringing this action has violated two funda-
mental rules. First·, he has no right to recover debts that 
have been discharged in bankruptcy. Second, upon the filing 
of the petition for bankruptcy, the trustee is the person who 
has title to all of the assets, causes of action and property 
of the bankrupt. Section 70 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 
§110 explicitly provides that the tr.ustee upon the filing of 
the petition for bankruptcy is vested by operation of law as the 
trustee. Clause.6 of §78 provides that the trustee is vested 
with title to all rights of action arising from "the unlawful 
taking .or detention of or injury to" the-bankrupt's property. 
Under this category, the courts have included actions for con.-
version, and actions based upon fraudulent misrepresentation and 
deceit through which the bankrupt has incurred heavy losses. 
1 Collier's Bankruptcy Manual, §70-2[7]. See also In Re Gay, 
25 Am.B.R. 111, 182 F. 260 (D.Mass. 1910); Constant v. Kulukundis, 
125 F.Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Rule 610 of the Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure provides clearly that the trustee. or receiver 
is the one who prosecutes or enters his appearance in defense in 
the pending action by or against the bankrupt on behalf of the 
estate. Because Mr. Phillips has filed bankruptcy, he is an 
improper p.arty plaintiff in this action and again there are inde-
pendent grounds for the case to be reversed. 
Because the plaintiff is an improper party plaintiff, the 
Court has ample authority to reverse on the basis that the plain-
tiff does not state a cause of action. The plaintiff has not 
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extinguished his remedies against the corporation, alleged 
grounds to pierce the corporate veil and further has failed to 
alle\::e that the individual creditors have been paid by him or 
L) 
that the creditors have initiated· some sort of action against 
him. 
POINT III 
THAT PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT WHICH REFERS 
TO THE DEFENDANTS OBLIGATION TO ASSUME 
CORPORATE LIABILITIES OF PHILLIPS CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY IS VOID AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IN VIOLATION OF. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
In the Court's Findings of Fact, the Court concluded 
that the plaintiff had $99,270.21 in obligations which were 
not paid in addition to the additional interest on the First 
Security and Northwest Carriers obligations in the amount 
of $2,624.69 and $4,283.40 respectively. (R. 236, Finding 
1123.) 
It is respectfully submitted that before the Court can find 
· the amount of the obligations as an item of damage for the plain-
tiff, there must be a showing that the assumption of those obli-
gations was one of the matters negotiated and arrived at between 
the plaintiff and the defendant JCM Development Company, James 
McGarry and James Gleason and memorialized in writing. Plaintiff 
at the time of trial introduced several warranty deeds but failed 
to introduce any of the documents evidencing the transfer of the 
stock in the corporation and failed to show any instrument which 
perpetuated the agreement in the earnest money to assume any 
obligations of the corporation. 
The necessary corollary of the failure to have an agreement 
signed by the party to be charged agreeing to pay the debts and 
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obligations of the corporation, is a finding that the obliga-
tion is void. If the original agreement is void, the Court 
cannot impose the void obligation upon the defendants. 
Utah Code Annotated §25-5-4 states in pertinent part as 
follows: 
In the following cases, every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement or 
some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith: . 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt 
default, or miscarriage of another •.•• 
(£mphasis .added}. 
The import of the statute is that any agreement to assume the 
debts and obligations of another that is not in writing, signed 
by the person to be charged is void. The Utah Supreme Court 
has referred to that statute on three different occasions and 
has held that where the agreement to pay the obligation is not 
an original promise, (a p~omise made at the time the debt is in-
curred,), but is a collateral promise (a promise made after the 
debt is incurred), the failure to have a writing evidencing that 
fact, signed ·by the person to be charged, is fatal. O'Hair v. Kounal, 
23 Utah 2d 355, 463 P.2d 799 (1970); Sugar v. Miller, 6 Utah 2d 433, 
315 P.2d 862. (1957); Brasher Motor and Finance Co.v. Anderson, 
20 Utah 2d 104, 433 P.2d 608. 
The earnest money receipt and offer to purchase, plaintiff's 
Exhibit 18, contains the following language on Line 21, 
$40;000.-Total down payment and assume 
existing loans on company-building-equip-
ment leaving a .balance df $38,950.00. 
The phrase in the earnest money agreement that the buyer was to 
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assume the existing loans on the company, building and equip-
ment, is certainly vague and ambiguous and the agreement itself 
contemplates a final contract of sale as .shown on Lines 35, 36 
and Lines 41 through 43 (Pl. Ex. 18). In any. event, plaintiff 
offered proof at trial tha~ went way beyond the loans on the 
company, building and equipment and introduced evidence of 
building supplies, petroleum bills for the business and many 
other miscellaneous expenses (Tr. 198-233). 
Particularly, the plaintiff testified to a (a) tax lien 
in the amount of $11,000.00 (Tr. 198); (b) two obligations 
owing to the State Tax Commission in the amounts of $761.17, 
$98.72 and $104.86 (Tr. 212); (c) the Division of Employment 
Security in the amount of $739.47 (Tr. 214); (d) the State Tax 
Commission in the amount of $1,106.93 (Tr. 215); (e) Riverside 
Accoustics in the amount of $695.07 (Tr. 216); (f) Kelly Insur.:: 
ance Company for medical insurance for his employees in the 
amount of $1,562.00 (Tr. 222-23); (g) Lou Schwabb ·for gas for 
.the company's equipment in the amounts of $674.43 and $243.79 
(Tr. 223); (h) Skipper Resources in the amount of $275.00 for 
surveying offices (Tr. 223); (i) Strong Construction Company 
in the amount of $1,754.00 for gravel (Tr. 224); (j) Motor Parts 
Company in the am~:mnt of $L~OO. 00 (Tr. 225); (k) R & R Radio 
for advertising expenses in the amount of $900.00 (Tr. 226); 
(1) M & J Sheet Metal in the amount of $500.00 (Tr. 226); 
(m) Associated Capital in the amount of $2,298.06 for radios 
(Tr. 228); (m) Jerry Pruett in the amount of $5,000.00 for a 
deposit on a proposal on a building (Tr. 228); (o) Plateau 
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Supply in the amount of $54.82 (Tr. 228); (p) Cont:inental Phone 
in the amount of $109.64 (Tr. 228-29); (q) Utah Power & Light 
in the amount of $548.00 (Tr. 230); (r) Mahoney Chevrolet in the 
amount of $439.62 (Tr. 230); (s) New World Life Insurance in 
the amount of $1,617.43 for employee insurance (Tr. 231); (t) 
Plat:eau Supply Company in the amount of $8,000.00 for materials 
including insulation and doors (Tr. 231); (u) Western. Construction 
Specialties in the amount of $269.00 (Tr. 231-232); (v) K. U. 
McDonald in the amount of $3,700.00 (Tr. 232); (w) Thompson 
Body and Glass in the amount of $400.00 (Tr. 232); (x) Spencers 
in the amount of $500.00 for office desks and chairs (Tr. 232); 
(y) Lewis Hardware in.the amount of $780.13 (Tr. 232); (z) New 
England Life Insurance for $3, 111. 36 for employee insurance 
(Tr. 232-233); (aa) the Employment Security Office of Utah State 
in the amounts of $938.80 and $6.11 (Tr. 233); (bb) the Unemploy-
ment Office in the amount of $731.74 (Tr. 234); and, (cc) the 
Internal Revenue Service in the amount of $826.46 (Ex. 39, Tr. 234). 
The debts and obligations set out above are simply that 
portion of the proof which has no bearing or connection with 
the terms written on the earnest moi1ey and offer to purchase 
relating to debts on loans on the company, buildings and e4uip-
ment. It is respectfully submitted that th.ere was no '\~riting 
between the parties evidencing an agreement to pay for the debts 
and obligations set out above and that any judgment which entails 
those items is void on its face. 
The other issue relating to the statute of frauds is whether 
or not the debts and obligations on the building and equipment 
-29-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
are enforceable in liPht of the fact that the parties exchanged 
0 
warranty deeds and the plaintiff conveyed all of his right, title 
and interest in the corporation to the defendant JCM Development. 
The Utah Supreme Court has been active on the doctrine of merger 
and has stated unequivocably that the execution of a warranty deed 
extinguishes the obligations under the earnest money agreement. 
In Kelsey v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 226, 419 P.2d 198 (1966), the 
Supreme Court held that where the real estate broker and his 
agent agreed to pay for draperies and other ext:ras involved 
in the transfer of property under the terms of the earnest 
money with the words "to be arranged", and also provided that 
the earnest money would be abrogated by execution of the final 
deed, that the subsequent conveyance by deed merged the prior 
agreement and the. agent was not: liable on the promise to pay 
for the draperies. 
In Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862 (Utah-1978), the Court held 
that the delivery and acceptance· of a deed, executed pursuant 
to the provisions of a precedent contract for the sale of real 
property merges the rights conferred by the contract into the 
deed. The Court explicitly noted. that unless there is new con-
sideration for the additional promise, the clause would be 
termed inseverable. 
In Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50 (Utah 1978), the Court 
restated again that: where the deed is given in full execution 
of the contract of the sale -0f the land, all provisions of the 
prior contract are merged therein, and when mer6er is contested by 
a party, the burden is upon him to show the contrary by clear 
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and convincing evidence. See also, Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 
979 (Utah 1979); Baxter v. Stubbs, 620 P.2d 68 (Utah 1980). 
In this case, the evidence is undisputed that there was no 
additional consideration for the promise of the defendants to 
assume the debts and. obligations of the corporation. Since 
the plaintiff could not enforce that agreement against the 
defendants, in that it violates the statute of frauds, it is 
an improper item of damage to be assessed against the defen-
dants in this action. Accordingly, since there was no agree-
ment between the plaintiff and the defendant JCN Development 
Company to assume the obligations, there is no evidence before 
the Court to establish that Phillips would not have been forced 
to pay those obligations regardless of who purchased the busi-
ness. If there was no contract: to assume debts, a solvent buyer 
would have refused to discharge them. 
One final matter should be mentioned. The statute of frauds 
has been held by the Supreme Court to be an affirmative defense, 
which, must be plead. There is.no question in this case that 
the answers filed by the defendants do not raise the· affirma-
tive defense of the statute of frauds. It is the defendants' 
position that there was no obligation on the part of the defen-
dants to raise the statute of frauds in that the plaintiff in 
his fourteen page complaint alleges the right to recover on the 
$35,000.00 ~nd $45,000.00 promissory notes and specifically 
alleges in paragraph 18 of the Fifth Cause of Action that he 
has not been paid for his assets and stock but alleges nothing 
about the debts and obligations (R. 1-14). Plaintiff alleges 
injury and damage in the amount of $200,000.00 which is not 
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specifically delineated. The plaintiff, under Rule 9(g) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has an affirmative duty to 
specifically plead special damages. The Rule states: 
when items of special damage are claimed, 
they shall be specifically stated. 
There was no indication in the pleadings throughout the course 
of the trial that would inform and apprise the defendants of 
the special damages claimed by the plaintiff and accordingly, 
the plaintiff has waived, as a matter of law, his right to 
recover for the debts and obligations. See Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co. 
537 P.2d 306 (Utah 1963). 
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff has waived 
his right to claim the debts as damages or, in the alternative, 
any duty the defendants had to make an affirmat~ve defense is 
obviated by the plaintiff's failure to specify the items of 
special damage which he contended he was entitled to recover. 
POINT IV . 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE 
RECORD TO SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT AGAINST 
ROBERT Al~DERSON FOR BREACH OF DUTIES OWED 
TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
In the case of Hutcheson v. Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah 
1981), the Utah Supreme Court stated the rule to be followed in 
reviewing the findings and judgment of the trial court. The 
Court's statement in that regard is a quotation from the Utah 
case of Charleton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 
(1961), which quotation is as follows: 
In considering the attack on the findings 
and judgment of trial court it is our 
duty to follow these cardinal rules of 
review: to indulge them a presumption 
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of validity and correctness; to require 
the appellant to sustain the burden of 
showing error; to review the record in 
the light most favorable to them; and 
not to disturb them if they find sustain-
tial support in the evidence. 
Hutchison, supra, at 816, 817. See also, Hove v. McMaster, 
621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980); Hopkins v. Wardley Corp., 611 P.2d 
1204 (Utah 1980). 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Ranch Homes, Inc. v. 
Greater Pa~k City Corp., 592 P.2d 620, (1978), it is the prerogative 
of the trial court to determine the facts and the Supreme Court 
will generally affirm when its determination thereof is supported 
by substantial evidence. However, when the findings is so 
plainly unreasonable that no trier of fact could fair.ly make 
such finding, it cannot be said to be supported by substan~ 
tial evidence and the finding will be rejected as a matter of 
law. 
In this case, the defendant, United Farm Agency, has a.rgued 
for reversal of the trial court's decision assuming that the 
court's findings as to the defendant, Anderson's conduct were 
warranted. It goes without saying that if Robert Anderson is 
·not liable for breach of fiduciary duty, as found by the Court, 
there is no liability for Clan Stilson or United Farm Agency. 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support a verdict against Robert Anderson as to a 
breach of fiduciary duty. The Court, in finding No. 25 of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 236), stated that 
the defendant Anderson breached his fiduciary duty by unilaterally 
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det::.ermining not to represent the plaintiff and by not advising 
the plaintiff that he was not representing him in the sale of 
his business. It is respectuflly submitted tha there was in-
sufficient evidence to justify such a finding. The defendant, 
Anderson, testified that he never explicitly advised the plain-
tiff that he was no longer representing the plaintiff but testi-
fied that he told the plaintiff, Hr. Phillips, that he would 
not negotiate and complete the sale using a simple stock trans-
fer and a bill of sale (Tr. 52). As indicated in the state-
ment of facts, under the listing agreement signed by Mr. Phillips, 
he retained the right to sell the property himself. Accordingly, 
it was not unusual or unexpected for Mr. Phillips to meet pri-
vately with Mr. Gleason and Mr. HcGarry in a back office for an 
hour to negotiate the deal. At that:. point, the plaintiff .had taken 
upon himself to negotiate the _terms of the sale (Tr. 43). 
It is respectfully submitted that even under the test as 
set out in Duggan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah T980), the real 
estate agent does not have a duty to force himself upon a client. 
After being advised that he was using an improper means to 
finance the transaction, he is certainly liable for all of the 
consequences of that decision. 
In finding No. 26, the Court conclud.ed that the de£en-
dant Anderson had breached his fiduciary duty in that he did 
not check into the solvency of JCH Development Company (R. 237, 
Finding No. 26). The defendant, Anderson testified that any 
amounts or figures relative to the worth of JCM Development 
Company or the individual defendants was simply a parading of 
the figures provided him by the defendant (Tr. 74, 88-89). 
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As indicated in the statement of facts, the defendant, Anderson, 
would not have dealt personally with JCM Development Company 
had he thought that the defendants were not solvent. It is 
respectfully submitted that there is no duty on the part of a 
real estate agent, to investigate the financial solvency of a 
person buying property. That is especially true in light of the 
fact that when the defendant was offered the $35,000.00 promissory 
note on August 14, 1978, in lieu of the cash which he was 
expecting, he stated that_ fact alerted him to the problem 
(Tr •. 283). As stated in counsel's question at trial, it would 
seem strange for a company which had substantial assets to have 
trouble coming up with $40,000.00 for the down_ payment. In 
light of the fact that the plaintiff, Phillips, knew of those 
problems, he went ahead and signed the notes. The defendant 
respectfully urges that the plaintiff's conduct was unreasonable 
and that his concerted effort to sell the business because of 
his financial troubles warrants the imposition of liability on 
him. 
The Court in finding no. 27 · (R. 237)_, states t:hat the defen-
dant Anderson breached his fiduciary duty by failing to have an 
attorney conduct the plaintiff's closing. As testified·to by 
the· defendant Anderson, he simply typed information that was 
requested by the parties. The defendant, Mr. Anderson, testi-
fied that he did not see the earnest money until almost a 
month later and was not aware that the August 14, 1978 meeting 
was a closing. Further, since James Gleason on behalf of the 
realty company in Salt Lake City was the person who conducted 
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~he closing, there is absolutely no authority tu impose the 
burden. upon the defendant Anderson to obtain an attorney. 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence is insuffi-
cient as a matter of law to impose liability upon Anderson and 
that the legal test used by the Court in defining the standard 
of care to be imposed upon the agent is improper. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant is not responsible for the conduct of Robert 
Anderson because Robert Anderson was not acting on their 
behalf or in furtherance of their interest. Robert Anderson 
was, in fact, an indep.endent contractor with whom the appellant 
had no employer-employee or master-servant relation with regard 
to the transactions in question. While it cannot be said that 
the plaintiff was ·unaware of Robert And.erson' s nominal affilia-
tion with appellant, it likewise cannot be said that the plain-
tiff had any dealings with anyone other than Robert Anderson 
nor can it be said that the broker or any other person in 
authority for appellant signed any of the required documenta-
tion pertaining to the transaction in question. 
If the appellant is vicariously liable for any wrong done 
to the corporation, Phillips Construction Company, the corpora-
tion possess the exclusive rights to any causes of action 
arising therefrom. The only theory upon which the plaintiff 
can sue individually is that the corporation, or its alter ego, 
if any, failed to satisfy its own obligations, causing the 
plaintiff to be liable therefor. The plaintiff never intro-
duced any evidence that the corporation was unable to satisfy 
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i~s obligation or that he had been pursued individually there-
for. The plaintiff committed further procedural error as to 
the form of causes of action alle~ed by failing to comply with 
the requireraents of the bankruptcy code. 
The plaintiff failed to specifically plead it:s special· 
dan1ages against appellant. This failure was. fatal to the plain-
tiff's ability to recover said damages and obviated any need 
for the appellant.to state affirmative defenses against such 
-special damages, which, in fact, are barred by the statute of 
frauds. 
Finally, an examination of the record in this case shows 
that there is such a complete absence of evidence in support 
of the plaintiff's position that Robert Anderson violated any 
duty owed to plaintiff that as a matter of law the decision 
must be reversed. 
DATED this 20th day of April, 1982. 
ACKSON HOWARD, FOR: }t2'f!i$¥Re y~E¥~·~ tJ e ¥~ft~~~~~ 
Appellant UFA, Inc. 
/ A ~--
CHARD B. JOHl~N,.~F~O..,,.Rc;....o:=--o::o..-
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant, UFA, Inc. 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLAHT to Hr. 
Paul W. Mortensen, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, P.O. Box 
339, Moab, Utah 84532; dated this 20th day of April, 1982. 
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